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LANDLORD - TENANT
A BREACH OF A RESTRICTIVE COVENANT:
DOES AN INTERLOCUTORY INJUNCTION LIE
AGAINST A THIRD PARTY IN GOOD FAITH
AND WITHOUT KNOWLEDGE?
by Howard KAMINSKY*
Cet article aborde le problème de la violation de l'exclusivité commer-
ciale consentie par un propriétaire à un locataire et examine la question de
savoir si la partie ainsi frustrée peut recourir à l'injonction interlocutoire pour
faire cesser cette contravention lorsque le tiers impliqué est de bonne foi.
L'auteur procède tout d'abord à un rappel des règles en matière
d'injonction pour ensuite exposer puis commenter la controverse jurispruden-
tielle existant à l'heure actuelle à ce sujet.
This article attempts to examine the scenario of a breach of a restrictive
covenant in a landlord-tenant situation, and deal with the question of whether
an interlocutory injunction is the oppropriate remedy against a third party in
good faith and without knowledge.
In the introduction, the author will give an overview of the concept of
injunctive relief in the province of Quebec and then focus on interlocutory
injunctions.
In the body of this work, the author will present conflicting jurispruden-
tial opinions to the above mentioned question, and then present a recent
decision.
The author concludes by expressing his personal opinion in light of the
said recent decision.
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INTRODUCTION
Article 751 of the Civil Code of Procedure of the Province of Quebec
(C.C.P.) provides for injunctive relief by way of direct action with or without
ancillary conclusions. Article 751 of the said code states:
«An injunction is an order of the Superior Court or of a judge thereof,
enjoining a person, his officers, agents or employees, not to do or to
cease doing, or, in cases which admit of it, to perform a particular act
or operation, under pain of all legal penalties».
Quebec law provides for two types of injunctions. One is the prohibitory
or restrictive injunction which directs a person to refrain from doing a specific
act or thing. The other is a mandatory or positive injunction whereby a person
is ordered to perform some act or operation. Since an injunction is an exceptio-
nal remedy, the courts are firm in asserting that entitlement to same must be well
established by the applicant. There are three possible stages of injunctive
procedures.
The first stage is the provisional stage (art. 753 C.C.P.). If a judge sitting
in chambers deems the circumstances precipitating the application to be urgent,
the injunction will be granted for a period of ten (10) days.
The second stage is the interlocutory stage. It is granted by motion upon
proof by the applicant that such procedure is necessary in order to avoid serious
or irreparable injury; or in order to prevent a factual or legal situation of such
nature as to render the final judgment ineffectual (art. 752 C.C.P.).
The third stage is the permanent stage. Although relieved of proving
urgency, an applicant must still, at this stage, discharge the burden of proof, of
entitlement and necessity.
Interlocutory Injunction: Pre-Conditions and Conditions
In this article, we will deal with the second stage, namely, interlocutory
injunctions. In order that an application for an interlocutory injunction succeed,
article 752 C.C.P. requires that two pre-conditions or tests be satisfied.
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Firstly, it is incumbent upon the applicant for such interlocutory relief
to establish the appearance of entitlement to same.  This would be accomplished
by demonstrating, prima facie, to the satisfaction of the court seized with such
proceedings, that a judge sitting in final instance might have a reasonable ground
for granting a permanent injunction.
Secondly, once the applicant has discharged the obligation of establis-
hing the appearance of entitlement, the said applicant must then fulfill the next
criteria of the interlocutory stage which is to satisfy the aforesaid court that such
an exceptional procedure is warranted in order to avoid: (i) serious or irreparable
injury or, (ii) a factual or legal situation of such nature as to render the final
judgment ineffectual.
Once the petitioner has established a right to interlocutory relief as a
result of discharging the first two pre-conditions, the courts will then determine
whether that right is clear and apparent. This will be accomplished by assessing
whether the representation in support of the petition demonstrates that the right
is either clear, non-existent or doubtful.
If the applicant is successful in discharging the burden establishing
«clear right» to such remedy, then the court should award the interlocutory
injunctive relief that was sought.
If the applicant has failed in its proof so severly, that its entitlement to
interlocutory injunctive relief appears to be non-existent, then the application
should be rejected.
In the event, however, that the judge hearing the interlocutory injunction
is doubtful as to the merit of such application, yet is not convinced that the
entitlement is non-existent,  the balance of convenience and inconvenience
should be examined in arriving at a decision.
All of the aforesaid principals, which reappeared for many years in
Quebec jurisprudence, were finally elaborated, confirmed and concisely set out
by Mr. Justice Owen in the case of Société de Développement de la Baie James
c. Chef Robert Kanatewat1, and have ever since, with rare exception, been
recognized by our courts as the established method of assessing and applicant's
right to interlocutory injunctive relief.
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Interlocutory Injunction and Third Parties
This article will deal with the issue of whether an interlocutory
injunction may enjoin a third party in good faith without knowledge, who is
nevertheless an unwilling participant in a breach by a landlord of a restrictive
covenant benefitting the party seeking the injunctive relief.
There is a general consensus in both jurisprudence and doctrine that in
cases involving a third party without knowledge in good faith, when a breach is
committed, an action in damages initiated by the aggrieved party against the
knowledgeable breaching party is certainly appropriate, and can be successful,
providing that the action has merits.
The Honourable Mr. Justice Derek Guthrie states, in Mordzynski v.
Devcorp Inc., when dealing with Petitioner which is a tenant, Respondent which
is a landlord and the «Mis-en-cause» which is a third party in good faith without
knowledge:
«Respondent breached its obligations under Clause 12 of the lease
(Exhibit R-2) when it accepted the Mise-en-cause's offer to lease dated
February 3, 1989 (Exhibit D-3) and when it signed the lease dated
March 2, 1989 (Exhibit D-2) containing a clause that stated the leased
premises were to be used "...comme commerce de détail de type
dépanneur ou de type coffee shop". For this breach the Petitioner has
a recourse in damages against Respondent»2.
With respect to injunctive relief however, it is not as clear as to whether
the entitlement exists against a third party in good faith and without knowledge.
We will now attempt to examine and analyse both positions in light of
the most recent jurisprudence, and conclude by formulating the writer's opinion.
THE OPINION THAT FAVOURS THE GRANTING OF INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF
The rule of law commonly known as «res inter alios acta» or «privity of
contract» is characterized by the fact that the effects of contracts are restricted
to the contracting parties. This law is set out in article 1023 of the Civil Code of
Lower Canada (C.C.) which states:
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«Contracts have effect only between the contracting parties: they
cannot affect third persons, except in the cases provided in the articles
of the fifth section of this chapter». (The "said section" is not relevant
to the present article.)»
In a relatively recent interpretation of article 1023 C.C., the Honourable
Mr. Justice Jean Moisan, in the case of Damain Inc. v. Place Laval-Roussin
Inc.3, conveyed, in his ruling, the idea that contracts may have a relative effect
upon third parties in good faith and without knowledge of such contract, and Mr.
Justice Moisan suppported his said interpretation by drawing from the doctrine
relating to the principal of «res inter alios acta» or «privity of contract». The
primary thrust for this argument stems from the writings of René Savatier4, who
expounds the theory that contracts in certain instances may have a relative effect
on third parties because a party has by contract forfeited its freedom to convey
certain rights to third parties. While the judge acknowledges that generally
contracts either create or extinguish rights, and that rights have effect only
between contracting parties, he nevertheless accepts that there are instances
where third parties may be the beneficiary or loser of such rights. Quoting from
the work of the said french author René Savatier entitled «Le prétendu principe
de l'effet relatif des contrats», Judge Moisan states:
«L'auteur examine ensuite deux types de contrats créant des obliga-
tions entre les parties et pouvant avoir un effet sur les tiers. Il s'agit
tout d'abord des contrats translatifs de droits et ensuite, plus générale-
ment, des contrats qui créent ou qui éteignent des obligations. Des
premiers, l'auteur écrit:
Sont également, par définition, opposables aux tiers
les contrats translatifs de droits. Car les droits qu'ils
transfèrent sont nécessairement destinés à s'opposer
à des tiers. La cession de créance perdrait tout son
sens si elle ne permettait pas au cessionnaire d'agir
contre le tiers débiteur. La cession d'un brevet
d'invention serait inintelligible si l'acquéreur ne
pouvait poursuivre les contrefacteurs; la vente d'un
immeuble ne se comprendrait pas si l'acquéreur
n'était pas en droit de le revendiquer ou de le dé-
fendre contre les tiers»5.
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Mr. Justice Moisan applied the theory of forfeiture of rights to conclude
that an interlocutory injunction can be granted against a third party in good faith
with no knowledge, and states:
«Dans ce bail, Place Laval a cédé à Damain un droit d'exclusivité qui
fait que, désormais, elle ne peut plus louer un autre local dans son
centre d'achats pour des activités de restauration. Jusqu'à ce contrat,
elle avait le droit plein, entier et incontestable de louer à n'importe quel
autre intéressé un local pour n'importe quelle fin, y compris la
restauration. Elle n'a plus ce droit. Elle l'a transporté, abandonné et
cédé à Damain. Elle a restreint sa liberté contractuelle d'autant. Elle a
fait en sorte que, désormais, Damain est la partie qui peut décider de
la présence d'une autre entreprise de restauration dans le centre
d'achats. Damain est, par son droit d'exclusivité, propriétaire d'un droit
affectant la jouissance de tous les autres locaux du centre.
Il s'agit bien là d'un contrat translatif de droits et, qui de plus est, de
droits portant sur la jouissance et l'utilisation de choses»6.
And further in the judgment, Mr. Justice Moisan adds:
«Mais Damain a sans aucun doute le droit de recourir à une injonction
pour faire cesser par ce tiers la violation d'un droit qui lui appartient»7.
Other notable authors upon which Mr. Justice Moisan relies to reinforce
his argument are Jean-Louis Baudouin and les frères Mazeaud.
THE OPINION THAT FAVOURS THE DISMISSAL OF INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF
The position that favours the dismissal of injunctive relief is the
narrower and more popular interpretation of article 1023 C.C.
Restrictive Interpretation
The vast preponderance of authors and jurists have embraced the
concept that the petition for interlocutory injunction is an exceptional procee-
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ding and as such, the merit of such position must be considered in a most
restrictive manner.
A leading example of such unwillingness of jurists to expand the
interpretation of article 1023 C.C. is the opinion of the Honourable Mr. Justice
Claude Benoit, when he rules in the case of Restaurant Vichy (Kirkland) Inc. v.
Miracle Mile Industrial Park Corp.:
«Aucune preuve n'a été faite de mauvaise foi de sa part ou de
connaissance de la clause d'exclusivité en faveur de la requérante.
Comment le Tribunal pourrait-il prononcer une injonction ayant l'effet
de lui interdire d'exploiter un "Rib Cage" quand elle a le droit de le
faire aux termes de l'offre de location et que le bail intervenu entre la
requérante et l'intimée lui est inopposable. Une personne non nommée
peut être tenue de respecter une ordonnance d'injonction dont elle a
connaissance mais encore n'est-elle tenue que d'obéir à l'ordonnance
adressée à l'intimée»8.
The said Honourable Justice explains that when there is an absence of
proof of bad faith or knowledge on the part of the third party against whom the
interlocutory injunction is being sought, he would find it not merely difficult, but
rather impossible, to enjoin the said third party from doing what it is lawfully
empowered to do.
The Honourable Madam Justice Dionysia Zerbisias, in Santana Jeans
Ltd. v. Adlexco Management Ltd., followed and respected the principals
examined by Mr. Justice Benoit and placed even less emphasis on knowledge
and good and bad faith. The said Madam Justice Zerbisias favoured the opinion
that the absence of proof of «lien de droit» either contractual or delictual,
between Plaintiff and a third party Defendant, was in itself sufficient ground
upon which to dismiss the application for interlocutory injunction. The said
Justice states:
«An order of injunction herein cannot lie against the Mise-en-cause
since there is no lien de droit, either contractual or delictual, between
it and Plaintiff»9.
In delving into the principals of article 1023 C.C. it is important to note
that the issue of knowledge of third parties as a method of bonding such parties
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to a contract is treated as an «exception» to the rule of privity of contract. In
107577 Canada Ltée v. Wasser, Plaintiff-Landlord was attempting to force
Defendant-Tenant to vacate the leased premises, claiming that the Defendant
breached its lease and was trying to sell beer and wine, which was an exclusive
right given to another tenant in the shopping centre. The Honourable Mr. Justice
Charles Gonthier studied this matter and made issue of the distinction between
real and personal rights, as they affect the principal of privity of contracts.
Inherent in real rights is registration and consequently knowledge, either actual
or deemed, but with respect to personal rights he states:
«Le droit à l'exclusivité invoqué par les demandeurs est créé par leur
bail et est rattaché à leur qualité de locataires. Il s'agit donc d'un droit
personnel créé par contrat qui ne lie pas les tiers en vertu du principe
de l'effet relatif des contrats, selon lequel ceux-ci n'ont d'effet qu'entre
les parties contractantes (art. 1023 C.C.) (...) L'absence d'obligation
contractuelle n'exclut pas cependant la possibilité d'une responsabilité
délictuelle si le manquement à une obligation contractuelle constitue
également un délit envers un tiers (...) C'est par application de cette
dernière notion que la jurisprudence et la doctrine française ont retenu
la responsabilité délictuelle du tiers qui connaissent l'existence d'une
obligation contractuelle participe avec une partie au contrat à sa
violation»10.
It is interesting to note that Mr. Justice Gonthier stated that while the
basis for application of injunctive relief against a third party necessitates the
element of knowledge, he couples that with the notion that the activities of a
third party must be tantamount to a delict, and thus introduces the element of
«good faith».
This notion was further dealt with by the Supreme Court of Canada
when it enjoined a third party to a contract to respect certain conditions of that
contract, but was quite clear and definite in establishing that such third parties
did have a «lien de droit» due to the fact that they had committed a delict, and
that such commission was made possible because such third parties did have
knowledge of the contract. In this case, Trudel v. Clairol Inc. of Canada, the
Supreme Court ruled that the third party not only knew of the restrictive
covenant and participated in its breach, but was in fact instrumental in inducing
a party to the contract to breach such contract. In the said case Mr. Justice
Martland states:
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«Appellant,  by inducing party to a breach of the contract between
respondent and each of its agents,  committed a delict for which he is
liable,  because it is an act of dishonesty to be associated knowingly
with a breach of contract»11.
Ineffectiveness
The courts have also treated the very particular problem of ineffective-
ness of such an exceptional proceeding against a third party. If the courts choose
to grant an interlocutory injunction, parties will be placed in situations that
require that they do, or cease to do things which extend beyond their legal
powers. Such situations place these parties immediately in «contempt of court»
with no possible remedy, obviously an unsatisfactory and counter productive
solution. In discussing these situations, Mr. Justice Benoit in Restaurant Vichy
(Kirkland) Inc. v. Miracle Mile Industrial Park Corp. states:
«Quant aux conclusions recherchées contre l'intimé locateur, la Cour
pourrait-elle les accorder, à supposer que les conditions attachées au
recours de l'injonction soient remplies? Oui, si l'intimé peut légalement
faire ce que la Cour lui ordonnerait de faire. Mais, dans la présente
affaire, le locateur a loué un local et en a livré possession au nouveau
locataire. Que peut faire le locateur pour empêcher le nouveau
locataire d'occuper les lieux et d'y exploiter un «Rib Cage»? Il est
impensable de lui permettre de recourir à la force physique. Si le
nouveau locataire a droit de continuer l'exploitation du local loué et si
le locateur ne peut légalement faire cesser l'exploitation, prononcer en
pareilles circonstances une ordonnance d'injonction contre le locateur
équivaudrait à prononcer une ordonnance à laquelle serait attachée une
condamnation certaine pour outrage au Tribunal, puisque l'on saurait
d'avance que l'intimé n'est pas en mesure de se conformer à
l'ordonnance. Et le but premier recherché par la requérante ne serait
pas atteint, savoir la fermeture du local: la requête en injonction n'est
donc pas appropriée»12.
Madam Justice Zerbisias also dealt with the issue of ineffectiveness of
interlocutory proceedings, which would leave a party condemned for contempt
of court, and unable to reverse such situation:
«Moreover, to so issue an injunction herein against the Defendants
under these circumstances would, if unopposable to the Mise-en-
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cause, effectively result in the eventual condemnation of the
Defendants to a judgment of contempt against them.
Moreover,  in the present case,  to issue an injunction at the
interlocutory stage, and to permit the Plaintiff to take possession of the
premises presently occupied by the Mise-en-cause, under an allegedly
valid lease, would create a state of facts which could not be undone by
the final judgment. Therefore an injunction will not lie at the present
stage for all conclusions sought by Plaintiff»13.
IN-DEPTH STUDY
In Mercerie Bougrine Inc. v. Les Galeries des Monts Inc. and Vêtements
Le Vieux Canot Inc.14, the Honourable Madam Justice Marie Deschamps was
presented with both arguments in deciding whether, at the interlocutory stage,
to enjoin a third party in good faith and without knowledge of a contentious
restrictive covenant. The said  judge did not share the opinion of Mr. Justice
Moisan and concluded that the interlocutory judgment should not prevail.
Commenting on the judgment Damain v. Place Laval-Roussin15, Madam Justice
Deschamps states:
«Dans cette affaire l'Honorable Jean Moisan a procédé à une étude
approfondie de la jurisprudence qui prévaut, mais l'a écartée en
invoquant une distinction entre l'effet des contrats et leur possible
opposabilité aux tiers. Avec déférence, la soussignée ne croit pas que
cette distinction justifie de s'écarter de la règle énoncée à l'article 1023
C.C.»16.
In arriving at this conclusion, Madam Justice Deschamps analyzed some
of the doctrine upon which Mr. Justice Moisan relied in support of his decisions.
When commenting on the following extract from professor Jean-Louis
Baudouin which Mr. Justice Moisan quotes to wit:
«382-Opposabilité des contrats - Dans l'appréciation de la portée de
l'effet relatif des contrats, il ne faut pas confondre deux notions
voisines et parfois difficiles à bien distinguer: l'effet de l'obligation et
son opposabilité. Si l'obligation contractuelle est sans effet vis-à-vis
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des tiers, en ce sens qu'ils ne peuvent en devenir créancier ou débiteur,
il n'en reste pas moins qu'elle leur est opposable. Le fait qu'un tiers ne
soit pas partie à un contrat ne lui donne pas le droit d'ignorer celui-ci.
Ce contrat lui est en effet opposable comme tout fait juridique. Ainsi,
l'employeur qui, en connaissance de cause, engage un individu qu'il
sait lié à son concurrent, commet une faute délictuelle et peut être
poursuivi en dommages. Le principe de l'effet relatif des contrats doit
donc être réduit à sa vraie dimension qui est la suivante: le tiers n'a
aucun droit de créance, ni aucune responsabilité obligationnelle en
raison d'une convention à laquelle il n'est pas partie. Il demeure
toutefois tenu de respecter celle-ci»17.
Madam Justice Deschamps states:
«Le professeur Baudouin n'émet donc pas un nouveau principe, mais
ne fait que reprendre ceux qui ont été appliqués par le Juge Benoit
ainsi que par le Juge Gonthier.
D'ailleurs le professeur Baudouin s'appuyait pour émettre son opinion
sur l'affaire Trudel v. Clairol Inc. of Canada, affaire, comme on l'a vu
plus haut, dans laquelle la Cour Suprême s'est fondée sur la
connaissance par le défendeur des droits de la demanderesse»18.
When we read the foregoing quote, it is apparent that the element of
knowledge is essential to the conclusion that a fault was committed. It seems
clear that if one has an obligation to respect legal circumstances, one must first
have knowledge of such circumstances. The same conclusion was drawn by
Madam Justice Deschamps in Mercerie Bougrine Inc. v. Les Galeries des Monts
Inc. and Vêtements Le Vieux Canot Inc.19, when she states in fact that professor
Baudouin did not stray from the established law and doctrine but in fact
maintained the principal that; prior knowledge of a breach of contract on the part
of the party against whom injunctive relief is sought is essential to the granting
of the injunction against such party. Madam Justice Deschamps acknowledges
that professor Baudouin based his conclusion on a judgment (previously cited
in this article) from the Supreme Court of Canada entitled Trudel v. Clairol Inc.
of Canada20.
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Madam Justice Deschamps also comments on an extract of a passage
from les frères Mazeaud cited by Mr. Justice Moisan. In direct dissension with
Mr. Justice Moisan, Madam Justice Deschamps uses this quote to support her
ruling that a contractual obligation between certain parties cannot be invoked to
enjoin a third party in good faith without knowledge of such contractual
obligation:
«L'affaire Damain prend également appui sur un passage des frères
Mazeaud. Il est intéressant de noter que la section portant sur le
principe que l'affaire Damain voudrait faire reconnaître est la suivante:
761. Les tiers n'ont pas le droit de méconnaître
l'existence des obligations. - L'obligation est un fait
que les tiers n'ont pas le droit de méconnaître.
Une abondante jurisprudence, notamment en matière
de contrat de travail, affirme la responsabilité d'un
tiers qui, sciemment, se rend complice de la violation
d'un contrat, et le condamne in solidum avec le
débiteur»21. (Les soulignés sont de la soussignée).
It is clear from the way Madam Justice Deschamps underlines the word
«sciemment» that this is the operative word in her quote. It demonstrates that
bad faith is the essential element required when granting an interlocutory
injunction against a third party, and consequently when that third party is in
good faith, the interlocutory injunction should not be granted.
When we focus upon the case law and doctrine quoted by Mr. Justice
Moisan, it becomes apparent that Mr. Justice Moisan has misinterpreted the
opinions expounded by the Justices and authorities that he quotes. In fact they
all expressed the opposite opinion to the one expounded by Mr. Justice Moisan.
Madam Justice Deschamps clearly took this position when, in assessing the
judgment of Judge Moisan, she said:
«On peut donc constater que ni les frères Mazeaud, ni le professeur
Baudouin, ni la Cour Suprême ne reconnaissent qu'une obligation peut
être opposable à un tiers si celui-ci n'a même pas connaissance de cette
obligation»22.
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23. Supra, note 4.
24. Supra, note 14 at 9-10.
Commenting on Mr. Justice Moisan's theory (previously discussed), that
by contract the holder has forfeited his freedom to exercise a right, all the
examples cited from Mr. Justice Moisan that were extracted from the work of
René Savatier23 entailed the use of the registration system used in the Province
of Quebec, or the federal laws on intellectual property. It is important that such
systems and laws have the effect of attributing «knowledge» whether apparent
or deemed. Madam Justice Deschamps, commenting on the various theories of
assignment of rights, draws comparisons between deemed or real knowledge,
and lack of same:
«Si on se réfère à la citation du Juge Gonthier dans l'affaire 107577
Canada Ltée v. Wasser, on se rappellera que le droit à l'exclusivité est
un droit personnel, comme d'ailleurs tout droit découlant d'un bail. Il
ne s'agit pas d'un droit réel qui pourrait "être opposé" au tiers par
simple cession. Le Code Civil prévoit spécifiquement un cas de
cession de droit personnel: la cession de créance. Le Code dicte
comment la cession peut être rendue opposable au tiers. Pour que le
tiers soit affecté par cette cession, il faut la publiciser par la
signification et la délivrance. On ne peut pallier à la cession et
délivrance que par l'acceptation.
En conséquence, même si on appliquait les règles de la cession de
droit personnel la nécessité de la publicité demeurerait présente»24.
CONCLUSION
In determining whether an interlocutory injunction lies against a third
party to whom a landlord has leased premises in violation of a restrictive
covenant in force between the common landlord and another tenant, the conduct
of the third party should be assessed. If the third party is revealed to have been
in bad faith with knowledge of the restrictive covenant which was breached, an
injunction should be granted against such third party. To the contrary, as
concluded by Madam Justice Deschamps, if the said third party is in good faith
without knowledge, no injunction lies. It is also the opinion of Madam Justice
Deschamps that Quebec jurisprudence has evolved to the point where mere
knowledge on the part of a third party of a restrictive covenant binding a
landlord would give rise to delictual liability, if the third party were involved
with the landlord in breaching such restrictive covenant and therefore, such third
party may be enjoined:
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«L'application des règles de la responsabilité délictuelle rend le
fardeau des parties moins lourd, mais exige quand même la
connaissance par le tiers des droits des parties. Il serait impensable de
pouvoir opposer à un tier non partie à un contrat, des droits dont il
ignore tout. L'évolution jurisprudentielle est telle maintenant que la
simple connaissance suffit par opposition à une participation à un
contrat, mais cette évolution jurisprudentielle ne permet pas une
contravention claire à la règle de la relativité des contrats»25.
This writer is in agreement with the opinion of Madam Justice
Deschamps when she incorporates the words of the frères Mazeaud (notably the
word «sciemment») and concludes that bad faith is the essential element
required when granting an interlocutory injunction against a third party and
consequently when that third party is in good faith, the interlocutory injunction
should not be granted. Mere knowledge is not sufficient to conclude that delict
has been committed. In order to conclude that a delict has been committed by
a third party, one must, in addition to establishing knowledge, evaluate the good
and/or bad faith of the said third party. By way of example we may turn to
Mercerie Bougrine Inc. v. Les Galeries des Monts Inc. and Vêtements Le Vieux
Canot Inc.26. In this case, the third party (Vêtements Le Vieux Canot Inc.) in
good faith without knowledge leased premises from the landlord of a shopping
centre, namely Les Galeries des Monts Inc., to operate a retail outlet identified
as a «Ralph Lauren style country store». This style of retail operation is a
relatively new concept to Quebec; it may be described as a «general country
store», having a wide range of products dominated by clothing, but including
everything from leather luggage to pot pourri, giftware and bath items. Mercerie
Bougrine Inc. had been granted, by said landlord, by way of restrictive covenant,
an exclusivity to operate a mens haberdashery or «mercerie pour hommes» in
the said shopping centre. In this case, both the landlord and the third party were
in good faith because in their judgment, the Ralph Lauren style country store did
not violate Mercerie Bougrine Inc.'s restrictive covenant. Madam Justice
Deschamps appropriately did not rule as to whether the lease between the
landlord and a third party, tenant, violated the restrictive covenant at issue,
because the third party was without knowledge of such restrictive covenant.
Even if there was knowledge on the part of the third party, but if the third party
was credible and satisfied the court that it believed it was not violating the
exclusivity granted to Mercerie Bougrine Inc., notwithstanding allegations to the
contrary, by the applicant for interlocutory injunction, the application for the
interlocutory injunction should not be granted. What would have happened  in
Landlord - Tenant
a Breach of a Restrictive Covenant:
170 Does an Interlocutory Injunction Lie (1991) 22 R.D.U.S.
Against a Third Party in Good Faith
and Without Knowledge?
the  event  that  it  was  proven  that  the  third  party  had knowledge of the
restrictive covenant between the landlord and Mercerie Bougrine Inc.? If we
were to adhere to the opinion of Madam Justice Deschamps, an interlocutory
injunction would lie only in the event that the conduct of the third party was
established to be tantamount to a delict.
